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Safer and stronger? The decline of the SNP’s managerial competence and liberal 
welfarism over justice policy in government, 2007-2016. 
 
Stuart MacLennan1 
 
Since the SNP came to power in 2007, they have sought to pursue two 
objectives with respect to matters of justice: to demonstrate managerial 
competence; and to ‘re-tartanise’ Scottish justice policy. While the headline figures 
present a generally positive figure of the SNP’s nine years in government, belying 
these figures is an increasing tendency towards illiberal and authoritarian justice 
policies, as well as mismanagement on the part of ministers. This article therefore 
considers the SNP’s approach to and management of justice policy, and whether or 
not they have been successful in the pursuit of their twin objectives. This paper 
considers the degradation of ministers’ once-strong relationship with the legal 
professions, the management of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, the 
establishment of Police Scotland, and the Scottish Ministers’ increasing deference to 
the police on ‘operational matters’. It further considers the continuation of the ‘ned-
bashing’ agenda of the Scottish Government, and concludes that, while ministers 
might rhetorically seek to appear liberal and welfarist, in contrast to England and 
Wales, the reality has been the pursuit of punitive policies that are arguably even 
less liberal, and less welfarist, than that of their predecessors, or their counterparts 
in England and Wales. 
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1. Introduction 
As a nationalist party, whose primary object is a constitutional one, it is difficult 
to divine a particularly distinctive SNP approach to justice policy. In general, there is 
little in the way of ideological underpinning to SNP policy – with social-welfarism 
being combined with neo-liberal economic policy. The policies that we have 
therefore seen pursued by the SNP in government have been something of a mixed 
bag, driven primarily by two discernable motives: a desire to portray themselves as 
competent managers; and a desire to highlight Scotland’s distinctiveness, in 
particular from the rest of the UK. 
This purpose of this article is not to critique the individual acts or policies 
pursued by the SNP government in the field of justice. Such critiques have already 
been offered (see, e.g., Croall, et al., 2012; Croall, et al., 2015; McAra and McVie, 
2010). Instead, the focus will be the Scottish Government’s approach to justice policy 
under the SNP, though such a discussion inevitably involves some consideration of 
individual decisions. It should not be assumed, therefore, that the acts and policies 
discussed in this paper have been selected because of their relative importance or 
because they were particularly controversial. Those acts and policies that are 
considered in this paper have been selected because they are illustrative of the 
Scottish Government’s overall approach to justice policy under the SNP. 
This paper is structured in three sections. The first section provides an outline, 
explanation, and assessment of the key headline numbers in the field of justice 
policy. These numbers present a mixed, but mainly positive picture of the SNP’s 
period in office.  
Section two considers the first prevailing objective of the SNP’s approach to 
justice policy in government: the desire to present themselves as managerially 
competent. This section analyses, in particular, the ministers’ relationships with 
stakeholders in the legal professions, as well as management of the Crown Office 
and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS), which might otherwise escape public 
comment. It further considers some of the more damning criticisms of SNP ministers. 
It criticises the SNP’s deference to the police on ‘operational matters’, and attempts 
to shut-down debate over policing policy. It also considers the the outcry over cuts 
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to legal aid, as well as the Scottish Government’s U-turn over the abolition of 
corroboration in certain trials.  
Section three considers the second key objective of the SNP in office: re-casting 
justice policy in Scotland as unique, and in particular, distinct from that of England 
and Wales. It concludes that, while the release of the Lockerbie bomber allowed 
ministers to paint a picture of a more liberal, welfarist approach to justice policy 
than their Labour predecessors, or England and Wales; their approach to offending 
amongst young people in areas of deprivation, in particular, appears to be every bit 
as punitive, if not more so, than in England and Wales. 
 
2. Justice in Numbers 
In general, the evidence suggests that the SNP has presided over a period of 
increasing police strength and falling crime statistics, however there remain some 
concerning trends within the overall picture. A key manifesto commitment of the 
SNP in the 2007 election was the provision of 1,000 additional police officers. From 
the beginning of Q1 2006 to the end of Q2 2007, the average police strength in 
Scotland was 16,206 officers. From the period beginning Q1 2009 and ending Q2 
2015 the average police strength has been 17,315 officers. This manifesto 
commitment has therefore been met and maintained (Scottish Government, 2014). 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
The data show a discernible drop in crime – both recorded and surveyed – in 
Scotland during the SNP’s period in government (Scottish Government, 2015a). 
Overall reported crime fell from 419,257 incidents in 2006-07, to 256,350 in 2014-15 
– a significant decline (it is worth noting that overall reported crime fell year-on-year 
throughout the SNP’s time in government – see figure 1). This is borne-out by a 
slightly less significant drop in victimisation in the Scottish Crime and Justice Survey 
(Scottish Government, 2015a).  There were also significant drops in recorded 
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instances of attempted murder and serious assault, robbery, drugs offences, 
weapons offences, most crimes of dishonesty2, and fire-raising and vandalism. 
However, marked increases in rape and other sexual offences can be observed (see 
figure 2), which might be explained, at least in part, by the broadening of the 
definition of rape by the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009. 
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
With respect to civil justice, the period 2008-2014 shows encouraging trends 
(see figure 3), though the extent to which responsibility for this is attributable to 
government, and not broader economic conditions, is questionable. Most notable 
during this period is a sharp decline in the number of debt actions initiated and 
disposed of in the Scottish Courts. The Scottish Government’s primary intervention 
in this respect is the Debt Arrangement Scheme (Scotland) Regulations 2011, which 
widened significantly the availability of debt arrangement schemes to debtors. 
However, since the economic downturn there is a wealth of evidence to suggest that 
both borrowers and lenders have been increasingly cautious (Bunn, 2014). Consumer 
credit is far less readily available, while consumers appear to be more willing to save, 
rather than borrow, in order to finance purchases.  
 
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
During the same period, the Bank of England observed a significant decline in 
household debt-to-income ratios (Bunn, 2014). Between 1999 and 2008, the 
household debt-to-income ratio increased from 90 per cent to a peak of 160 per 
cent. Thereafter, while the stock of household debt stabilised, the ratio began to 
decline, reflecting modest increases in household income. This suggests a decline in 
consumers taking on new debts, and an increased emphasis upon servicing existing 
                                                     
 
2 With the exception of shoplifting, which has remained largely static. 
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debts. It follows, therefore, that this will lead to a decline in defaults and non-
payment of debts, with a corresponding drop in the number of debt actions in the 
courts. A sharp decline can also be observed in the number of eviction and 
repossession actions, which, again, can partly be explained by a more risk-averse 
financial climate. There has been a modest increase in the number of personal injury 
claims, while the number of family cases remains fairly static. While these numbers 
generally paint a picture of modest success, this has not prevented the SNP’s 
management of justice policy from becoming a target of criticism from opposition, 
academics, and press alike. 
 
3. Managerial competence 
Having assumed office for the very first time in 2007, a key objective of the SNP 
Government in all areas of policy is demonstrating a fitness to govern. Serious 
managerial failures on the part of a party in power for the very first time might well 
do significant long-term damage to such a party. As such, the SNP’s first term in 
office appears to have been a relatively cautious one. Perhaps emboldened by their 
majority victory in 2011, the SNP’s second term in office has seen the pursuit of 
more controversial policies. However, the SNP’s second term in office has also been 
one in which the managerial competence of certain ministers has been questioned. 
This is particularly true where justice is concerned. 
A minister’s background will inevitably inform their approach. It is known in the 
civil service in Scotland that ‘wherever your minister comes from your policy will 
shift to there’ (Mooney et al., 2014). Therefore, the biographies of the SNP justice 
ministers are more than mere penumbra in understanding the SNP’s record in 
government. While it is unusual for health professionals to ever serve as health 
ministers, or educators to serve as education ministers, lawyers have dominated 
justice ministries under the SNP. While lawyers in justice ministries bring with them 
relationships with stakeholders that others often have to spend years building, 
‘experts’, as Attlee once opined, often ‘make the worst possible ministers in their 
own fields’ (Hennessy, 2001: 147). It would be grossly unfair to apply such harsh 
judgement to the SNP’s five justice ministers. Nonetheless, criticism of the SNP’s 
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oversight of justice and legal affairs focuses heavily upon management, rather than 
policy. 
 
Relationships with professions 
Through the SNP’s nine years in office, justice policy has been led by two Cabinet 
Secretaries, and three junior ministers; as well as two Lords Advocate and two 
Solicitors General. By far the dominant amongst these ministers was the long-
standing Cabinet Secretary for Justice, Kenny MacAskill. A solicitor by profession and 
a widely known figure in the Scottish legal profession, MacAskill is a veteran of the 
SNP’s left-wing 79 group, first elected for the Lothian region in 1999 and becoming 
the MSP for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh in 2007. MacAskill’s closeness to Alex 
Neil – leadership rival to Alex Salmond in 2004 – was seen by some as contributing to 
his defeat when he ran in 2004 for the post of SNP deputy leader. Nevertheless, 
upon being elected leader Salmond appointed MacAskill to the shadow justice 
portfolio  
 Though throughout the SNP’s period of office, a long-standing member of the 
SNP’s left wing has dominated the justice portfolio, the supporting junior ministers 
have been known for their more conservative political views. Following the SNP’s 
victory in 2007, Inverness MSP Fergus Ewing was appointed Minister for Community 
Safety. A fellow solicitor and son of SNP elder Winnie Ewing, Fergus Ewing is perhaps 
the most prominent remaining member of the once-dominant SNP right. Following 
the 2011 election, Ewing was appointed Enterprise Minister, a post in which he 
arguably appears more comfortable. Roseanna Cunningham replaced Ewing as junior 
minister. Erstwhile bearing the moniker ‘Republican Rose’, Cunningham is another 
former member of the 79 Group. However, in recent years, Cunningham has been 
better known for her more conservative views on social issues. Almost cementing 
the rule that the junior justice post has to be held by a conservative, Cunningham 
was succeeded as Minister for Community Safety and Legal Affairs in 2014 by Paul 
Wheelhouse, a former member of the Conservative Party. Following Nicola 
Sturgeon’s succession to the office of First Minister, MacAskill was replaced as 
Cabinet Secretary by Michael Matheson, MSP for Falkirk West.  
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Lawyers have a palpable advantage in justice ministries – in particular in a small 
jurisdiction such as Scotland. The advantage is not one of knowledge or professional 
competence, but an advantage with respect to the relationships with stakeholders 
that are so crucial to the success of ministers in any field. Lawyers like to deal with 
one of their own, and consequently the legal profession broadly welcomed 
MacAskill’s appointment in 2007.3 
The good will enjoyed by MacAskill and Ewing in the SNP’s first term allowed the 
Government to pursue structural reforms of the legal profession. Evidence that 
MacAskill and Ewing were sympathetic to the interests of the legal professions can 
be seen in their response to an Office of Fair Trading report on legal services in 
Scotland (Scottish Government, 2007). MacAskill rejected the adoption of a legal 
services board for Scotland (something similar had recently been established in 
England and Wales) on the grounds that such a measure would be ‘a 
disproportionate and inefficient response’ (Scottish Government, 2007). In turn, and 
in stark contrast to the legal professions’ obstinate opposition to previous 
liberalisations of the legal services market (Stephen, 2013), the Law Society of 
Scotland welcomed the Scottish Government’s consultation Wider Choice and Better 
Protection, including proposals to permit the introduction of alternative business 
structures. 
The Legal Services (Scotland) Act 2010 has as its primary aim the removal of 
current restrictions in the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980 on how solicitors organise 
their businesses. The Act seeks to further loosen the monopoly enjoyed by the 
Faculty of Advocates and the Law Society. It allows solicitors to form partnerships 
with non-solicitors, and to seek investment from outside the profession (the so 
called ‘Tesco Law’). Throughout the Bill’s progress there was an evident desire 
amongst politicians of all hues to curry favour with the legal professions. For 
example, early versions of the Bill permitting 100 per cent ownership by non-
                                                     
 
3 A similar observation could be made of Jim Wallace, who was the only lawyer 
to hold a justice portfolio in the previous Labour/Liberal Democrat coalition 
government. 
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solicitors of legal service providers was amended by the opposition parties at 
Holyrood (at that point constituting a majority) to require 51 per cent ownership by 
solicitor investors or members of regulated professions. Nonetheless, despite 
attempts by opposition parties at currying favour with the professions, such 
comprehensive reforms would not have been so easily achieved but for the strong 
relationships that existed between ministers and the professions. This generally 
positive relationship with the profession appears to have lasted into the SNP’s 
second term, with the Law Society welcoming MacAskill’s re-appointment in 2011. 
However, within a year that relationship was to deteriorate significantly. By 2012, 
Edinburgh Bar Association President Cameron Tait described MacAskill’s relationship 
with the legal profession as ‘irreparable’ (BBC, 2012). 
Amongst the measures MacAskill sought to pursue with which the professions 
took umbrage was significant reforms to the provision of legal aid, with the 
expressed objective of cutting costs (Rose, 2014). Lawyers engaged in active revolt 
over the Scottish Civil Justice Council and Criminal Legal Assistance Bill – which 
reduced significantly the income level at which legal costs would have to be paid for 
by parties. Following a series of one-day walk outs by criminal defence lawyers at a 
number of Sheriff Courts, MacAskill intervened to increase the qualifying threshold 
from a disposable income of £68 per-week to £82 (BBC, 2013). 
Ministers drew further criticism from the legal professions for pursing the 
abolition of the corroboration requirement in rape trials, inter alia. Following the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Cadder v. HMA, the Scottish Government commissioned a 
wide-ranging review of criminal procedure in Scotland, to be led by Lord Carloway. 
Amongst his recommendations was the abolition of the requirement that evidence 
be corroborated in trials for certain sexual offences. The proposal was expectedly 
welcomed by police and victims’ groups, however more sceptically received by 
academics and judges. (Nicolson and Blackie, 2013) 
The arguments in favour of abolition were three-fold. The first, was that the 
requirement is inconsistent and ineffective, is not fit for purpose. The second, is that 
it is disproportionately prejudicial to the interests of victims and the public. The 
third, is that judges and juries can be trusted to evaluate accurately the strength and 
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reliability of evidence free from legal regulation and because there exist a range of 
other protections against unjust convictions.  
The Scottish Government welcomed the proposal, taking the view that ‘[t]he 
rationale for the rule stems from another age, its usage has become confused and it 
can bar prosecutions that would in another legal system seem entirely appropriate’ 
(Scottish Government, 2012, 41). However, in the face of sustained opposition from 
practitioners (Faculty of Advocates, 2015), in particular, the proposal was dropped 
by new Justice Secretary Michael Matheson soon after his appointment.  
 
Management of crown office and procurator fiscal service 
Upon taking office in 2007, Alex Salmond sought to “de-politicise” the office of 
Lord Advocate, by retaining Elish Angiolini, first appointed by Jack McConnell, in her 
post – inviting her only to attend cabinet where necessary. Salmond ostensibly 
sought to transform the office of Lord Advocate from a ministerial post to an 
administrative one. Nonetheless, the Lord Advocate remained the Scottish 
Government’s chief legal advisor and remained in charge of the Crown Office and 
Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS).  
The management of the COPFS has been the subject of considerable criticism in 
recent years. In 2008, Crown Office mismanagement led to the collapse of the trial of 
Angus Sinclair, accused of the ‘World’s End’ murders in 1977 (MacQueen and 
Wortley, 2008). In response to outcry over the trial’s collapse the Scottish 
Government ordered a review into Scotland’s double jeopardy rule, which paved the 
way for the eventual scrapping of the rule for certain serious crimes in the Double 
Jeopardy (Scotland) Act 2011. The Act – which, somewhat controversially, had 
retrospective effect – led to the re-trial and eventual conviction of Angus Sinclair. 
While the legislation attracted cross-party support in Holyrood, it is arguable that a 
significant protection for accused persons – that the Crown cannot simply keep 
trying someone until they get the result they want – should not have been scrapped 
simply because of the errors of the COPFS.  
COPFS has attracted further criticism in recent years. Two examples will have to 
suffice. The first pertains to the trial of former Downing Street Director of 
9 
 
 
Communications and News of the World Editor Andy Coulson. Coulson was acquitted 
as a result of Lord Burns’ ruling that the evidence presented by the Crown Office was 
‘not legally relevant’ owing to the fact that ‘not every lie amounts to perjury’ in Scots 
law. James Chalmers has questioned why the case was brought to trial in the first 
place (Leask, 2015). The second was a 2015 decision by COPFS not to prosecute the 
driver of a bin lorry that crashed in Glasgow, killing six people. The decision, taken in 
advance of a fatal accident inquiry into the crash, which revealed that the driver had 
not disclosed past instances of blackouts to his employers or the DVLA, sparked 
outrage amongst some victims’ families who decided to pursue a rare private 
prosecution in response to the decision (BBC, 2015a). 
It is arguable that these controversies, and others, might have been avoided but 
for the increasingly ambiguous role of the Lord Advocate. Alex Salmond’s decision to 
downgrade the role, de jure, from an ostensibly ministerial one to an advisory one 
has not been matched by any organisational changes. The Lord Advocate is both 
Scotland’s chief prosecutor and also the responsible member of the Scottish 
Government. The division that has existed in England and Wales since the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1879 between the Attorney General and the Director of 
Public Prosecutions – where the former provides ministerial oversight of the latter – 
does not exist in Scotland. It is arguable the COPFS in Scotland effectively acts 
without ministerial oversight – which is exacerbated further by the effective removal 
of the Lord Advocate as a minister in the Scottish Government.  
 
Establishment of Police Scotland 
Until the mid 20th century, Scotland had scores of police forces, with every County 
and Large Borough Council providing its own force. This local provision of policing 
was carried forward following the Wheatley Review of Local Government and its 
implementation in the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 - with regional councils 
assuming the responsibility for the provision of a police force. The Local 
Government, etc. (Scotland) Act 1994 significantly weakened the link between local 
government and policing. That act reorganised local government into 32 unitary 
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authorities, with responsibility for policing being retained at a regional level through 
regional police authorities.  
However, the link between local government and policing was broken entirely 
by the Scottish Government’s merger of Scotland’s eight police forces into a single 
force – Police Scotland. The SNP has been refreshingly honest about the reasons for 
the merger. While it might have been tempting to argue that such a merger was 
motivated by a desire to improve coordination and organise on operational rather 
than regional bases, the Scottish Government has never sought to pretend the 
exercise was motivated by anything other than budgetary savings (Scottish 
Government, 2011). However, at least two consequences of the merger have 
attracted significant criticism. 
The first criticism is that the merger of Scotland’s eight forces into one has 
resulted in a ‘one size fits all’ model of policing, without the regional variations 
afforded by the eight previously existing forces. The policing policies and practices of 
urban and central Scotland quickly made their way into employment in Scotland’s 
more remote and rural communities. The deployment of armed police on patrol in 
small highland towns such as Beauly and Brora has sparked alarm amongst residents 
and politicians from the Highlands and Islands (Ross, 2014). Independent, formerly 
SNP, MSP John Finnie has led the opposition to this policy, forcing MacAskill to 
respond to criticism in the Scottish Parliament. MacAskill defended the policy, 
stating that he he believes ‘that the public understands and accepts the need for a 
small number […] of police officers to be authorised to carry firearms and for the 
chief constable to have operational independence over their deployment and use’ 
(Scottish Parliament Official Report, 2014). This deference to the ‘operational 
independence’ of the police is increasingly commonplace amongst SNP ministers, 
and is discussed further below. 
The second criticism is that what little political oversight of Scottish Policing that 
remained following previous reorganisations was all but removed, with the new 
Scottish Police Authority (SPA) being charged with scrutinising Police Scotland. While 
Police Scotland has not lacked critics, such criticism has been notably unforthcoming 
from the SPA. Instead, in the face of vociferous criticism of Police Scotland, the SPA 
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appeared to be its staunchest defender with SPA chair Vic Emery issuing joint 
statements with Chief Constable Sir Stephen House in defence of the force (Police 
Scotland, 2015).  
Public criticism of the force became loudest following the deaths of John Yuill 
and Lamara Bell. Yuill and Bell died following a car crash on the M9 to which Police 
Scotland did not attend until 72 hours after it was first reported to the police (BBC, 
2015b). Bell was still alive and reportedly trying to escape when the police arrived at 
the scene, before subsequently dying in hospital. Outcry over this failing was quickly 
followed by the resignation of Police Scotland’s Chief Constable, Sir Stephen House. 
Reported dissatisfaction amongst other members of the SPA (Hutcheon, 2015a) was 
soon followed by the announcement that Emery would not seek re-appointment as 
chair of the SPA. 
 
Deflective and Illiberal 
In the face of mounting criticism over justice policy, in particular with respect to 
policing, the Scottish Ministers’ increasingly standard response has been to seek to 
deflect criticism by insisting that such questions concern ‘operational matters’ upon 
which they therefore cannot comment. However, the Scottish Ministers’ 
understanding of what constitutes an ‘operational matter’ appears to be unlimited in 
scope, which is a cause of some considerable concern. 
There are two possible explanations for this stock response, which are not 
mutually exclusive. First, is that Scottish Ministers have become so ‘house-trained’ 
that they find themselves entirely subordinate to the Police. This first explanation 
has been christened ‘Ploditis’ by Kevin McKenna (2015), which he describes as ‘a 
condition that attacks the central nervous system and reduces the victim to a jelly-
like state in the presence of top brass from le vieux Guillaume’. Were this first 
explanation to be accurate then this represents a truly worrying state of affairs: 
through their obsequiousness, the SNP would have effectively handed over control 
of policing policy to the police. A second, and no less worrisome explanation is that 
the SNP wish to depoliticise policing (i.e. removing it from the sphere of political 
debate). If this is the case, then in effect the consequence appears to be that either 
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the police, or the Scottish Ministers, are given carte blanche over policing policy. 
While the SNP, obviously, cannot be blamed for the ineffectiveness of their 
opponents in critiquing their policies in government, attempting to shut-down all 
discussion about policing policy reflects an illiberal streak that is becoming 
increasingly commonplace in the Scottish Government’s approach to justice policy.  
This can further be seen in the Scottish Government’s approach to the release of 
stop and search data, in particular with respect to research undertaken by Kath 
Murray (2014), discussed further below. The Scottish Government and Police 
Scotland appeared to have gone to great lengths to hinder Dr Murray’s research, 
including attempting to release data on the condition that anything published in 
relation to the data be subject to pre-approval by Police Scotland. Furthermore, it 
was reported that the Scottish Government sought to block the publication of data 
that would lead to unflattering comparisons with England and Wales (Hutcheon, 
2015b).  
There can be little doubt that the management of justice and policing has 
become a weakness of the SNP in Government. As a result it has become the focus 
of both opposition parties and the press. However, the Scottish Government’s 
response to such criticism has been extremely concerning, with ministers seeking to 
shut down all public discussion about policing policy, in particular, by deference to 
the ‘operational independence’ of the police.  
 
 
4. Re-tartanisation 
In the summer of 2009, Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill took the decision to 
release Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi – the only person ever convicted of the 
bombing of flight PanAm 103 over Lockerbie (more commonly referred to as the 
Lockerbie Bomber) on compassionate grounds. The decision to release Megrahi on 
compassionate grounds is discussed in detail below, with the decision being justified 
by the fact that ‘[i]n Scotland, we are a people who pride ourselves on our humanity. 
It is viewed as a defining characteristic of Scotland and the Scottish people (Scottish 
Parliament Official Report, 2009). It has long been claimed that the Scottish justice 
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system is underpinned by distinctive principles. McAra charts the de-tartanisation of 
criminal justice policy since the inception of devolution (2006). However, while it 
appears that one aim of the SNP in government has been to re-tartanise justice 
policy, the extent to which they have succeeded in doing so remains highly 
questionable. 
There is little doubt that the approach to criminal justice policy in Scotland was 
once markedly different. Mooney, et al. (2015) offer one plausible explanation for 
the divergence between justice policy and Scotland and the rest of the UK: that pre-
devolution justice policy was administered almost entirely by civil servants, with 
decisions being ‘virtually rubber stamped’ by ministers, buttressed by a succession of 
Secretaries of State who were more liberal than many of their southern colleagues. 
McAra and Young (1997) argue that this divergence can be attributed to Scotland’s 
smaller size fostering a stronger ‘civic culture’. 
While the tide of punitivism was held back by Liberal Democrat Justice Minister 
Jim Wallace for a period, the criminal justice agenda of the Labour-led Scottish 
Executive was heavily focused upon dealing with the problem of youth offending by 
‘neds’4 through anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) and downgrading of community 
sentencing. Though it is arguable that this distinction between Scotland and the rest 
of the UK was more apparent than real, any attempt at maintaining this pretence 
was, arguably, largely abandoned in the early days of devolution. 
The de-tartanisation of criminal justice policy during the immediate post-
devolution period can, in part, be explained by the removal of the administration of 
justice from supposed ‘elites’ - from the Westminster Government and the civil 
service in Edinburgh - to Scottish Ministers who come-from and represent some of 
the most deprived areas in Scotland. Furthermore, there existed a discernable desire 
for policies in Scotland not to deviate too far from those of the New Labour 
Government in Westminster, for fear that the SNP (then in opposition) might these 
exploit such divergences. Expectedly, the SNP’s accession to office in 2007 
                                                     
 
4 Commonly understood to stand for ‘non-educated delinquents’.  
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eliminated any will for Scottish justice policy to converge with that of Westminster; 
with the opposite desire, at least perceptively, being the case. 
 
Release of the Lockerbie bomber 
The release of Megrahi had long been an objective of Quadafi’s Government in 
Libya. This became abundantly clear in the course of Libya’s rapprochement with the 
United Kingdom in the period beginning the early 2000s. Megrahi’s detention in a 
Scottish prison inevitably put the Scottish Ministers at the centre of any decision as 
to his fate. The decision saw numerous competing factors at play. The U.S. was 
determined that Megrahi should not be released under any circumstances, and 
argued that the 1998 agreement between the UK and U.S. precluded such a release. 
Conversely, the UK was keen to further improve its relationship with Libya, with 
commercial considerations being the primary motive (Kenealy, 2012). Knowing of 
the UK’s commercial interests, Libya tied the conclusion of a prisoner transfer 
agreement (PTA) to the furtherance of broader cooperation with the UK. Scotland’s 
position, however, shifted – largely as a consequence of the unfolding of events. 
Initially, Scotland’s position with respect to UK-Libya relations was that they 
were not being adequately consulted in the PTA process, particularly given that the 
only Libyan serving a sentence in a UK prison at the time was Megrahi. This, it is 
arguable, was primarily motivated by a desire to be seen to be standing up for 
Scotland’s interests against an indifferent UK government. Fearing being placed in a 
difficult position and being subject to significant external pressure from multiple 
parties with competing interests, the Scottish Government was insistent that any 
PTA should contain a specific exception for Megrahi. While the UK was initially 
sensitive to the concerns of the Scottish Government, the PTA was ultimately 
concluded without any exception for Megrahi. 
The dynamics of the situation shifted considerably in October 2008, following 
Megrahi’s diagnosis with terminal prostate cancer. This diagnosis presented SNP 
ministers with a third option, one that would allow the Scottish Government to put a 
uniquely Scottish gloss on the situation. Megrahi’s terminal diagnosis presented the 
possibility of release from prison on compassionate grounds under the Prisoners and 
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Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993. Compassionate release presented two 
attractions for SNP ministers. First, it allowed the Scottish Government ‘to articulate 
a distinctive Scottish identity with specific values of compassion and justice’ 
(Kenealy, 2012: 569). Second, it facilitated the othering of the UK government, by 
contrasting Scotland’s compassionate approach with the UK’s shady dealings 
motivated by commercial interests. It is highly likely, according to Kenealy (2012: 
560), that had Labour been in power in Scotland that Megrahi would have been 
released anyway, but under the PTA, and not on compassionate grounds. 
Internationally, the decision met with a mixed response. While the Libyan 
Government praised Scotland for its compassion, the U.S. was in uproar. President 
Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publicly berated the Scottish 
Government ministers. This elevated Alex Salmond and Kenny MacAskill to 
international renown, even if only for being the subject of US derision. Cognisant of 
their own role in seeking Megrahi’s release, the UK Government was expectedly 
mute on the subject, stating that it was a decision for the Scottish Government, 
alone, to take (Sparrow, et al., 2009). 
Domestically, too, the decision met with a mixed reaction. On the one hand, 
there remained considerable doubt about the soundness of Megrahi’s conviction in 
the first place (Black, 2004). On the other, the Scottish Labour Party sought to use 
the issue as a wedge, and came out vociferously against the release of Megrahi. This 
position, however, was compromised considerably by the then-Labour UK 
Government’s efforts to secure Megrahi’s release. However, the primary difficulty 
for SNP ministers came not at the point of Megrahi’s release; but long after Megrahi 
was expected to have died, but didn’t. While compassionate release can normally 
only be granted where a prisoner is expected to live for not more than three months, 
Megrahi remained alive in Libya for three years. This raised questions about the 
quality of the medical evidence sought by MacAskill in order to justify release on 
compassionate grounds. Labour MSP Dr Richard Simpson, a former associate 
member of the Society of British Urological Surgeons, described the release under 
the three-month rule as ‘highly questionable’ (Scottish Parliament Official Report, 
2009). 
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Notwithstanding the ongoing criticism of the decision to release Megrahi, the 
ultimate objectives of the SNP were met. The Scottish Government was able to paint 
a picture of uniquely Scottish values which underpinned the decision, whilst 
simultaneously placing Alex Salmond and Kenny MacAskill squarely, albeit fleetingly, 
at the centre of the world stage. Yet despite this broadly successful effort at painting 
Scottish justice policy as unique, and distinct from that of England and Wales, in 
particular – the distinctiveness of Scotland and/or the SNP’s approach to justice 
policy is far less considerable than the SNP’s rhetoric over Megrahi suggests. 
 
“Neds” 
Throughout the SNP’s first term, in particular, the opposition Labour Party 
continued to attempt to paint the SNP as soft on crime, relentlessly advocating a 
somewhat sensationalist ‘carry a knife, go to jail’ policy. However, notwithstanding 
the rhetoric of the Labour party, the reality is that the SNP had abandoned its earlier 
pretence to liberalism and welfarism in justice policy. By 2008, cracks began to 
appear in the SNP’s liberal, welfarist veneer. Concerned about the scourge of 
drunken teenagers blighting Scottish towns, the Scottish Government launched a 
pilot programme designed to test the viability of raising the age at which younger 
people could purchase alcohol in off-licenses. The pilot was met with sustained 
resistance, led the Coalition Against Raising the Drinking Age in Scotland (CARDAS). 
The pilot was condemned by campaigners for demonising younger people, reflecting 
the new government’s return to the ‘neds’ agenda of their Labour predecessors. In 
light of this opposition, the pilot programme was ultimately abandoned. 
However, the ‘neds’ agenda appears not to have vanished from the Scottish 
Government’s minds. The SNP’s second term in government has revealed one of the 
more deplorable aspects of Scottish policing policy; the massive proliferation of ‘stop 
and search’, in particular with respect to children and young people. There exists 
considerable evidence that the use of stop and search is focused on the problem of 
‘neds’, with such searches being employed in abundance in areas of relative 
deprivation and, in particular, on younger people. In 2010, Strathclyde Police 
conducted approximately 37,000 searches of 16 year olds. With approximately 
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26,000 resident 16 year olds, this amounts to 1.4 searches for every 16-year-old 
resident in the Strathclyde region. Notably, in 2010, approximately 500 searches 
were conducted of children under the age of 10 (Murray, 2014: 25). 
Data shows sharp rises in the use of stop and search in Scotland, in particular in 
the former Strathclyde and Central force areas (Murray, 2014: 15). Further evidence 
from Police Scotland suggests that this upward trend continued after the creation of 
the force. However, despite the sharp focus, within the stop and search strategy, 
upon young people, the basis for such a focus is extremely questionable. Despite an 
overwhelming focus upon young people, Murray identifies a ‘huge discrepancy’ 
between the number of searches of young people carried out and the relatively 
consistent detection rates across all age groups. Thus, according to Murray (2014: 
26), 
 
the sharp discrepancy between the age distribution of searches and 
persons charged, together with low detection rates, suggests that 
young people may be over-policed in some parts of Scotland, that is, 
subject to excessive levels of stop and search, over and above the 
probability of offending. 
 
The most notable distinction between Scotland on the one hand, and England 
and Wales on the other, is the use of non-statutory searches. Police Scotland’s 
guidance as to when a consensual search may be carried out provides that,  
 
[w]here an officer wishes to conduct a consensual search on a person 
who is not acting suspiciously, nor is there any intelligence to suggest 
that the person is in possession of anything illegal, then this search is 
consensual and the officer must ask the subject if they can search 
them. (Murray, 2014, quoting Police Scotland) 
 
Such searches of persons where the police have no lawful grounds to suspect 
that a person is acting illegally in any way have been outlawed in England and Wales 
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owing, inter alia, to difficulties in obtaining informed consent. The typical defence of 
such strategies is that they have a deterrent effect. It has been argued that the low 
detection rates from such searches are in fact evidence of the success of the policy 
(BBC, 2010). This logic is clearly specious. There is no evidence of a direct link 
between the likelihood of being searched and the likelihood of offending. Most 
criminological studies of such a link are inconclusive, but highly sceptical (Bland, et 
al., 2000; Manning, 2010). 
The focus of stop and search on young people and areas of relative deprivation 
reflects a continuation of the ‘ned-bashing’, ‘ASBO-wielding’ approach of SNP 
ministers’ Labour predecessors. While rhetorically, MacAskill invoked ‘compassion’ 
and ‘humanity’, the reality is that the approach of the SNP in government has been 
remarkably similar to that taken by their predecessors; and in some respects is 
arguably less liberal, and less welfarist, than in England and Wales. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
For the period 2007-11, the SNP in government broadly succeeded in satisfying 
the twin objectives of managerial competence while portraying Scottish justice 
policy as distinctive from that of England and Wales. In their first term in office, SNP 
ministers successfully steered significant reforms of the legal professions through 
parliament, maintaining good relations with the professions throughout. Though 
some managerial failings were evident – in particular, in the COPFS – SNP ministers 
largely avoided any blame. Meanwhile, the most controversial decision of the SNP’s 
first term presented ministers with an opportunity to present Scottish justice policy 
as unique, with the added advantage of elevating Scottish ministers to notoriety on 
the world stage. 
However, the second term saw ministers encounter considerable difficulties in 
the management of justice policy. The reorganisation of Scotland’s police forces, as 
well as cuts to legal aid, and a U-turn over the abolition of the requirement for 
corroborated evidence in sexual offences trials significantly tarnished MacAskill’s 
reputation as a competent manager. MacAskill’s eventual exclusion from the 
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Scottish Government is doubtless in part attributable to these failings. Furthermore, 
the SNP’s second term has eroded the perception that Scottish justice policy is more 
liberal and welfarist than England and Wales. 
Of greatest concern is the Scottish Government’s purported deference to Police 
Scotland’s ‘operational independence’. The only conclusions that can be drawn from 
this increasingly standard response is either that SNP ministers do not believe that 
such matters ought to be the subject of political discourse, or that SNP ministers are 
not overseeing policing policies at all. Both of these conclusions are extremely 
concerning – and portray and authoritarian and illiberal streak in SNP ministers. 
The SNP will doubtless enter the 2016 Scottish Parliamentary election campaign 
rightly boasting of their maintenance of increased police strength, as well as year-on-
year drops in overall crime. However, the overall picture of the SNP’s management 
of justice policy in government, in particular since 2011, is of mismanagement and 
illiberalism – and therefore represents one of the greatest weaknesses of their nine 
years in power. 
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Figure 1. Total recorded crimes in Scotland, 2006-15. 
 
Source: Scottish Government, 2015a 
 
Figure 2: Recorded sexual offences in Scotland, 2006-15. 
 
Source: Scottish Government, 2015a  
 
Figure 3: Civil actions initiated in Scotland, 2008-14. 
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Source: Scottish Government, 2015b  
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